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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 23, 1999, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces
bombed the headquarters of the Serbian state radio and television station
killing sixteen civilians and injuring many more.' The bombing was part of
a seventy-eight day bombing campaign that began when Yugoslav President
Slobodan Milosevic refused to comply with NATO demands to withdraw
forces from Kosovo and cease the ongoing persecution of Albanians.' The
attack on Belgrade was part of an allied intervention that cost NATO over four
billion U.S. dollars NATO forces dropped more than 23,000 bombs, killed
over 5,000 Yugoslav military personnel and 1,500 civilians, and caused
roughly 100 billion U.S. dollars worth of damage to Yugoslav factories,
refineries, bridges, and roads.4 NATO has been strongly criticized for
launching indiscriminate attacks resulting in unnecessary civilian casualties.5
NATO has been criticized specifically for the targets of their attacks, the
weapons used, and the means for carrying out the bombings.6
The region of the former Yugoslavia is not a stranger to war.7 Its strategic
location has made it susceptible to invasion and rule by several empires as far
back as history is recorded As a result, the people of the former Yugoslavia,
* J.D. 2002, University of Georgia; B.A. Philosophy & Religion, Hendrix College, 1998.
See Serb TV Bomb Victims to Sue NA TO, BIRMINGHAM POST, July 17, 2000 at 9,
available at LEXIS, News Group File.
2 See Nicholas Rufford & Emily Milich, Families to Sue Britain Over Belgrade Blitz,
LONDON TIMEs, July 16, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File.
' Richard B. Bilder, Kosovo and the New Interventionism: Promise or Peril? 9 J.
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5 See Amnesty International, NA TO/Federal Republic ofYugoslavia, "CollateralDamage"
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because of their diverse religious and historic backgrounds, have lived in a
perpetual state of ethnic tension.9
Though one might expect this deeply-rooted ethnic tension inevitably to
result in the war that began in 1991, more immediate factors led to the
conflict.' ° There was a measurable rise of Serb nationalism in the 1980s that
directly contributed to the rising tensions in the area." Leading this Serbian
nationalism was the eventual Communist Party chief, Slobodan Milosevic. 2
Milosevic's use of federal troops against Albanians in Kosovo began his
campaign to acquire power over all of Yugoslavia. 3 This quest to increase
Serbian power sparked heated resistance from the Yugoslav republics of
Croatia and Slovenia, who were concerned with the increasing power of the
Serbs.
In 1991, after failed attempts to negotiate with Milosevic over a new
Yugoslav constitution, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. 4
Milosevic then ordered the Yugoslav National Army into Slovenia to protect
Serbs living in the area, and the fighting began.' As early as 1992, Bosnian
President Alija Izetbegovic asked for NATO airstrikes, but all requests were
denied.' 6 NATO's refusal to send forces earlier has been criticized as the
gravest mistake of the Yugoslav crisis, as some feel that early intervention
would likely have led to a more peaceful result and avoided many of the
atrocities that ensued."
Nevertheless, criticism and scrutiny followed when NATO forces did
finally intervene, particularly after the raid that destroyed the radio television
station and took the lives of unsuspecting civilians.' The arguably civilian
nature of the radio television station made its bombing one of the most
controversial of the seventy-eight day campaign. The victims' families are
now suing the British Government and seventeen of the nineteen members of
9 See id.
'0 See id. at 25.
" See id.
12 Id.
13 See id.
14 See id. at 26.
15 See id.
16 The United States said that no military resolution from outside was possible. See id. at
30.
17 See id. at 30-31.
" See Amnesty International, supra note 5, at 2.8-2.9.
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NATO' 9 pursuant to article two20 and article ten2 of the European Convention
on Human Rights.
It has been stated that this war was waged, not "in the name of national
interests, but rather in the name of principles and values ... It is fighting
because no decent person can standby and watch the systematic, state-directed
murder of other people."' This humanitarian rationale provided a basis for
NATO and the leaders of the Member States to vigorously defend the bombing
campaign. This defense may be inadequate, however, if NATO's actions
violated the laws of war. The success of the claims brought by the victims'
families depends largely on the legal principles governing the waging of war
and methods of attack.
Amnesty International is one of many groups that has publicly accused
NATO forces of committing "serious violations of the laws of war leading in
a number of cases to the unlawful killings of civilians." 3 While one may
expect civilian casualties in war, laws exist that are designed to prevent
unnecessary civilian deaths. These laws prohibit both direct and indiscrimi-
nate attacks on civilians. They further proscribe the bombing of military
targets that could have a "disproportionate impact on civilians or civilian
objects."2 These laws of war and other guidelines are set out in Protocol I
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.2" Though ratified by over 150
states, three of NATO's members are not parties to the Protocol: France,
Turkey, and the United States.26 Many Protocol I articles specifically provide
for the protection of civilians and demand that armed forces distinguish
civilian targets from those that are military in nature. Such measures extend
to protecting civilians even when used to shield military targets by parties to
a conflict.27 It is the articles in this Protocol and others that Amnesty
International has accused NATO and its member states of violating.
Also relevant to the legality of NATO's use of force in Yugoslavia is the
U.N. Charter, particularly articles two and fifty-one. Article 2 states, "All
"See Rufford & Milich, supra note 2, at 32.
20 European Convention on Human Rights, Europ. T.S. No. 005 at article 2, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/Treatieslhtml/005.htm (guaranteeing the right to life).
21 Id. at art. 10 (protecting freedom of expression).
2 Richard A. Falk, NA TO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of
International Law 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 847, 848 (1999).
2 Amnesty International, supra note 5 at summary preceding report, para 3.
24 Id. at 6.
" See id. (quoting Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Oct. 2, 1950,
6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287).
26 See id. at 6-7.27 See id. at 8.
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Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the [p]urposes of the United Nations."2
Because the attack on Yugoslavia commenced without the consent of the
Security Council, it would appear that the bombing was in direct violation of
Article 2 of the U.N. Charter.
Article 51 allows the use of force for self-defense. It states, "Nothing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security., 29 Here, there may be more room for argument that
the NATO forces acted collectively in self-defense. However, as no NATO
members were actually attacked by Yugoslavia, this too proves problematic.
It has also been suggested that NATO's actions constitute "anticipatory
collective self-defense."3 This right has been recognized under customary
international law and requires that the anticipatory self-defense be "necessary,
instant, overwhelming, and admitting of no other alternative with no moment
for deliberation.",31 It is questionable, however, whether such a standard is in
force in the U.N. Charter.
This note examines all of these issues with respect to the ongoing suit
against NATO member states for the bombing of the radio television station
in Belgrade. The legal issues associated with Great Britain's sinking of the
Argentine ship Belgrano offers insight for predicting the outcome of the suit
by these Yugoslav families.32 First, this note discusses the mechanics of how
these families are actually able to bring the suit. Then it explores the
substantive merits of the case. Finally the work concludes with assertions
regarding the legitimacy and prudence of the families' claim and any problems
associated with allowing a suit of this sort to be commenced.
28 U.N. CHARTER art. 2.
29 Id. at art. 51.
30 See, e.g., Aaron Schwabach, The Legality oftheNA TO Bombing Operation in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, 11 PACE INT'L L. REV. 405, 409 (1999).
" Id. (quoting R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 89
(1938)).
32 Relatives of 323 sailors that were killed on the cruiser General Belgrano in the 1982
Falklands conflict attempted to sue Great Britain for alleged violations in the attack. The
Belgrano was sunk by a British torpedo when it was outside the 200-mile total exclusion zone
that was declared around the Falkland Islands after Argentineans seized the colony in 1982.
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II. FILING A CLAIM IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The ability of individuals to act in international law, specifically to bring
suit in the European Court of Human Rights, has undergone a great deal of
change in the past several years. Historically, it was the responsibility of states
to take action on behalf of their citizens. Today, individuals may file suits
against states in the European Court of Human Rights.33 States may also bring
actions against each other, though this rarely occurs."'
The European Court of Human Rights was created to enforce the European
Convention on Human Rights." The Convention is a series of articles
expounding upon fundamental human rights not to be violated by the High
Contracting Parties to the Convention. While the Convention has existed since
1950 and entered into force in 1953, the procedures for bringing claims has
evolved over time, and the number of claims has substantially increased as a
result.3
6
In 1981, a total of 404 applications for suit were filed with the Court." In
1994, this number increased to 2944.38 Since then, the number of applications
has skyrocketed.39 The workload of the Court increased by forty percent in
1999, and as of September 1, 2000, there were 15,107 applications pending,
with an additional 6835 applications that were newly registered between
January 1, and August 31, 2000.' President of the European Court of Human
Rights, Luzius Wildhaber, in urging the parties to the convention to support
more vigorously, noted that the Court is now receiving some 170 phone calls
and over 720 letters per day.4' The number of claims are likely related to
increased awareness of the court, the high level of conflict in Eastern Europe,
and the ease with which an individual with little or no legal background may
make an application to the court.'2
" See FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW,
POLICY, AND PROCESS 478 (2d ed. 1996).
34 See id. at 479.
" See id. at 19.
36 See id.
17 Id. at 479.
36 Id.
'9 See Press Release, infra note 40.
40 Press Release, Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, European Governments
Urged to Increase Support for Human Rights Court (Sept. 28, 2000), available at http://www.
echr.coe.int/Eng/Pres/2000/Sept/press%2briefing%2028%202000%o2Oepress.htm.
41 Id.
42 See id.
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Originally, the application process was set up with three separate branches
to handle applications.4' A Commission on Human Rights first looked at the
application to determine admissibility." This first stage was largely a
screening process that encouraged settlement and made preliminary decisions
on possible violations based on the facts of the case.45 Based on their
judgment, the Commission referred cases either to a Committee of Ministers
or the European Court, where final decisions were made on cases.6
Today, seeking redress in the Court may begin by simply logging on to the
Internet.47 Any person wishing to apply can access an application that is
created to be easily understood by most literate adults seeking redress for
potential violations.48 While written in plain language, ambiguities and
questions arise in the application process that one may look to case law to try
and resolve.
The notes for persons wishing to apply to the European Court of Human
Rights lay out two important limits to those wishing to apply to the Court.
First, the European Court of Human Rights can only hear cases that arise from
violations of the Articles and Protocols to the European Convention on Human
Rights.49 Secondly, the Court does not act as a court of appeals from national
courts and "cannot annul or alter their decisions."5° The instructions to
potential applicants give rise to certain questions regarding redress for victims
of violations. If a national court awards a very small or nominal judgment,
does that preclude further action by the plaintiff in the European Court of
Human Rights? Would a larger award by the Court of Human Rights
constitute a modification of a nominal award by the national court, and
therefore be impermissible?
One of the most troubling areas of the application gives rise to a particu-
larly important issue regarding the procedure for selection of cases to be
admitted to the court. The notes state, "the Court can only deal with an
43 See NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 33, at 479.
4See id.
45 See id.
"See id.
47 See Application to the European Court of Human Rights, available at http://www.echr.
coe.int/BilinqualDocuments/Applicationlnformation.htm#ln formation%20ForT/2OApplicatio
ns%20/%20Concernant%201es%20Requests (last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
49 See id.
" See Notes for the guidance of persons wishing to apply to the European Court of Human
Rights, at para. 6, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDOCS/InfodocRevised2.htm (last
visited Feb. 6, 2002).
so Id.
[Vol. 30:617
LAWS OF WAR
application after all domestic remedies have been exhausted."' Here, one
must wonder what constitutes "domestic remedies" and which state is able to
redress one's complaint. The case at issue here allows for two possible
interpretations.
First, as Serbia is not a Contracting Party to the European Convention on
Human Rights, it is not bound by the Convention or the European Court of
Human Rights. Therefore, it would seem that the Plaintiffs in Belgrade would
be forced to seek redress in the highest British Courts before being allowed to
apply to the Court of Human Rights.52 This conclusion is strengthened when
one considers the difficulties involved in sending heads of state to represent
their governments in forums that may be hostile or unstable.53
Conversely, it seems unduly burdensome to force victims to go to
considerable trouble and expense to travel to the state of the alleged wrongdoer
and try to navigate a legal system with which they may well be unfamiliar. As
of yet, one of the few indications that Great Britain is the state which is
"concerned" and able to redress the complaint is that the attorneys representing
the families in Belgrade are from a firm in Colchester, England.' This
presumption is not conclusive since the British solicitors are only part of an
international legal team representing the families for no fee. 55 To date, there
has been no mention of the case coming before the High Courts in Great
Britain.
The situation is further complicated by a six month time limit from the date
of the judgment of a state's highest court to apply to the European Court of
Human Rights.5" If the time limit is not complied with, the Court will not
allow the case to proceed. Recent cases shed some light on both the require-
ments of seeking redress in the highest court in the concerned state and the
mandatory six month filing period. In July 2000, the European Court of
Human Rights dismissed the Belgrano case because it did not fall within the
"' Id. (Paragraph 6 used to read "one must exhaust all remedies in the State concerned which
could redress the complaint." Though the wording has changed, the ambiguity regarding the
state in which one must seek redress remains. The language of the application has changed since
October 2000 when this was written).
5 Great Britain has been a party to the Convention on Human Rights since 1951.
5 It would not seem prudent, for example, to send the foreign minister from Britain to
Belgrade to stand trial for the wrongful bombing of the radio television station. Not only would
one fear for his life in an area plagued by war, but it would be difficult to have an impartial trial
in a state that is so unstable.
5" See Rufford & Milich, supra note 2, at 1.
55 See id.
56 See Notes for the guidance of persons wishing to apply to the European Court of Human
Rights, supra note 49, at para. 6.
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six months required for application." The facts of that case are substantially
similar to those presented in the Belgrade bombings: 323 sailors on the cruiser
General Belgrano were killed when the British nuclear submarine Conqueror
torpedoed the vessel outside a 200 mile "exclusion zone.""8 As a result,
families of the victims sued Great Britain pursuant to Article 2 of the
Convention on Human Rights. 9 Former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
was heavily criticized for the decision to bomb the Belgrano, and all efforts to
litigate the case in Argentina or have Thatcher extradited were unsuccessful.'
Because there was no action taken in the British Courts, the six month
statute of limitations was deemed to have begun on the day of the sinking of
the Belgrano in 1982.1 Therefore, the panel ofjudges at the European Court
of Human Rights rejected the Argentine attorneys' argument that the time
period should run from the final attempt to seek redress in the Argentine
Courts in March 2000.62
Why is it that the judges at the Court of Human Rights require the legal
action to take place in Great Britain? It seems particularly harsh in the
Belgrano case because it would have been next to impossible for the families
to bring the case within the six month time limit. The sinking of the Belgrano
sparked the Falklands War, surely making legal action by families of victims
particularly difficult at the time. Nevertheless, the case was rejected.
Another case explains relevant provisions of the application regarding
exhausting domestic remedies. In Rehbock v. Slovenia, 3 Ernst Rehbock, a
German national, was arrested in September 1995 by Slovenian police and
accused of smuggling and dealing narcotics. During his detention in Slovenia,
he was severely maltreated and was refused medical attention."
57 See Harvey Thompson, Lawsuit against Britain over Belgrano sinking thrown, WORLD
SOCIALIST WEB SITE (July 28, 2000), available at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/juul2O0/
belg-j28.shtml.
" Andy McSmith Belgrano Families to sue Britain, ELECTRONIC TELEGRAPH (June 30,
2000), available at http://www.spaceship-earth.de/Letters/Editor/Belgrano_ familiestosue_
Britain.htm.
s9 See id.
60 See Christopher Lockwood, Thatcher shrugs off call for prosecution over Belgrano
Sinking, THE TELEGRAPH (July 7,2000) at http://www.seprin.com/gralbelgrano.htm. See also
Thompson, supra note 57, at 1.
6 See Thompson, supra note 57, at 1.
62 See id.
' Rehbock v. Slovenia, European Court of Human Rights, App. No. 00029462/95 (Nov.
II, 2000), available at http://hudoc. echr.coe.int/hudoc.
6See id.
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In September 1995, an application was submitted to the European
Commission of Human Rights. The application alleged violations of articles
three, five, and eight of the European Convention on Human Rights."5 In
arguing against Rehbock, the government of Slovenia objected because
Rehbock had not exhausted the domestic remedies available as required by
Article 35 of the convention.' Here, the court rejected the government's
argument not because Rehbock had in fact exhausted such remedies, but
because Slovenia had not raised the objection prior to the Commission's
decision to admit the application. 7
It is difficult not to be troubled by the apparent inconsistency between
Rehbock and the Belgrano dispute. If Rehbock was correctly decided, and the
case was admitted because of a procedural error on Slovenia's part, why does
it not specify in Article 35 that an objection must be raised prior to the
decision by the Commission on whether to hear the case? Article 35, section
1 states that "[t]he Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic
remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of
international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the
final decision was taken." Nowhere does it state that objections must be filed
based on a violation of this article before the Commission's decision, and to
presume such a requirement would be an unlikely conclusion to be extracted
from "generally recognized rules of international law." 9 Further, there is no
provision requiring notice to opposing parties that an application is being
submitted, so there is no way of guaranteeing that Slovenia knew of the
application before it was too late to register an objection.
These inconsistencies appear to put the Belgrano decision on even more
unstable ground. There is no indication that objections were or were not filed
before the Court decided not to accept the application. However, efforts were
made at a judicial resolution to the conflict, even if they were tried in
Argentina rather than Great Britain. The Belgrano case warrants at least as
much attention as was given Rehbock, particularly as the case involved the
death of over 300 sailors.70 Despite its importance and similarity, the Belgrano
6' Article three is a prohibition of torture and article five guarantees the right to liberty and
security. Article eight guarantees the right to respect for private and family life.
" See Rehbock, supra note 63.
67 See id.
68 European Convention on Human Rights, Europ. T.S. No. 005 at article 35, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreListeTraites.htm).
9 Id.
70 The Court of Human Rights has indicated that deprivation of life is subject to particular
scrutiny. "The Court recalled its constant caselaw that it must subject deprivations of life to the
2002] 625
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
case was thrown out on the very procedural grounds that the Commission
found permissible in Rehbock.
In trying to resolve the apparent discrepancy, one may look to the
Convention's language and the application. Unfortunately the language of the
application offers little help. The pertinent part of paragraph seven extracts
some of the same language from the Convention: "It is... absolutely essential
that before applying to the Court, you should have tried all judicial remedies
in the State concerned. . . You must accordingly have first applied to the
domestic courts, up to and including the highest court with jurisdiction in the
matter."'" On its face, this provision indicates that exhausting domestic
remedies is a measure which must be complied with and cannot be waived.
Moreover, it does not seem to leave any room for judicial discretion. Again,
if judicial discretion were appropriate with reference to such requirements,
why is it not utilized in situations where bringing suit within a six month
period would be unduly burdensome?
One final question that arises with respect to these cases and possible
implications for the suit for the Belgrade bombing arises from the explanation
given by the European Court of Human Rights regarding the Belgrano suit.
In rejecting the suit because it was filed after the legal time limit, the Court of
Human Rights said that because there were no proceedings filed in the British
courts, the six months began from the date the Belgrano was sunk on May 2,
1982.7 This implies that if the suit had been filed within six months of the
incident, the case would have been able to proceed. However, if the suit was
able to proceed if filed within six months of the incident despite the fact that
there were no proceedings in British Courts, would this not imply that the
requirement of exhausting domestic remedies is able to be waived? If so, the
effect would be that the suit can be filed within six months of the possible
violation or within six months of exhausting domestic remedies, assuming that
one seeks those remedies in the courts of the correct state. These conclusions
contradict the language of both Article 35 to the European Convention on
Human Rights, and the Notice and Information to potential applicants. 3
most careful scrutiny." Gul v. Turkey, European Court of Human Rights, App. No.
00022676/93 (Dec. 14, 2000), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc.
", Notes for the guidance of persons wishing to apply to the European Court of Human
Rights, supra note 49, at para. 7 (emphasis added).
71 Clare Dyer, Court SinksArgentine Sailors Case, WORLDNEWS, (July 21,2000), available
at http://www.theage.com.au/news. See also Thompson, supra note 57, at 1.
71 The language of the Convention and the Notice to Applicants is substantially similar. The
Convention states that "[t]he Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies
have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within
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Despite competing precedent, the Belgrade families' suit was accepted by
the Court of Human Rights, which indicates at least their initial success.
74
Now the Court must decide whether the case is well-founded.75 If the Court
decides that the complaint is well-founded, it will then consult with the
accused governments. As noted earlier, this can be a very lengthy process.
Given the Court's heavy and increasing workload, it is difficult to predict
when the case will be resolved.
76
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR BOMBING UNDER THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
In looking to the merits of the case, one is guided by Articles 2 and 10 of
the Convention. Particularly important is Article 2(a), which states,
"Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this
article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely
necessary: a. in defense of any person from unlawful violence. 7 7 Here one
encounters difficulty in applying the Article to the facts of the case. In and of
itself, bombing a broadcasting station, particularly one that employs civilians,
is a violation of the article. After all, it is an intentional deprivation of life and
is illegal.78
Article 2(a) may offer a defense to the bombing as legal action in response
to unlawful violence. Here, one looks to the criminal accusations and
justifications for the NATO bombing. As was previously stated, since the
U.N. Security Council did not authorize the NATO bombing it technically
violated the U.N. Charter.7 9 Thus, if the bombing is to be successfully
defended, it must be done on different grounds. Here, one may examine a few
a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken." European
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 20, at art. 35. The Notice to Applicants excludes the
reference to generally recognized rules of international law; ".. .before applying to the Court
you must have tried all remedies in the State concerned by means of which it might have been
possible to redress your grievance. You must accordingly have first applied to the domestic
courts, up to and including the highest court with jurisdiction in the matter.. ." Notes for the
guidance of persons wishing to apply to the European Court of Human Rights, supra note 49,
at para. 7.
14 See Nato in Dock over Belgrade Bombing, BBC NEWS, Oct. 18,200 1, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk.
7' See id.
76 See Press Release, supra note 40 (there are currently 15,107 applications pending).
" European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, at art. 2.
78 See id.
71 See Bilder, supra note 3, at 156-57.
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possibilities for the defense of the bombing, and further look at whether it is
necessary for the bombing campaign to be legal under the U.N. Charter for it
to be allowed under Article 2 of the Convention.
One possibility for defending the bombing is that it was a part of a military
campaign justifiable under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter on self defense.80
That Article refers to the "inherent right of individual or collective self defense
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations."'" The
problem here is that Yugoslavia has taken action against Croatia, Bosnia, and
Slovenia, none of which is a NATO member.8 2 Neither are they Members of
the United Nations and as such do not fall within Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter on individual or collective self defense. Also, the NATO action
probably would not constitute self defense because Yugoslavia did not
represent a significant threat. The International Court of Justice has said that
a state needs to be more than a threatening presence in order to justify self
defense under Article 51.83
While reactive collective self defense may be unauthorized here, the
bombing can arguably be justified under the doctrine of anticipatory self
defense. While it is unclear whether such a right exists under the U.N.
Charter, it is generally recognized under customary international law."' There
was likely sufficient threatening behavior by Yugoslavia to justify anticipatory
self defense, though it is important to ascertain who was threatened by
Yugoslav action. Since 1991, Yugoslavia has taken military action against
Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia, and its action has been aimed at enlarging
Yugoslav borders, particularly in those areas which are populated by Serbs."5
Given the threatening presence, one must look to which one of the NATO
member States borders Yugoslavia or is immediately threatened by Yugoslavia
in order to justify the bombing." There is probably not a sufficient threat to
a NATO member to justify the action. None of the States attacked by
Yugoslavia has been a NATO member, and the only Member State that
'0 See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
sId.
32 See Schwabach, supra note 30, at 410.
"See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
"See Schwabach, supra note 30, at 409.
"See id. at 410.
"The Caroline case, decided in 1842, formulated a test to justify a response which requires
anticipatory self-defense to be proportional: the need must be instant, necessary, and
overwhelming, allowing for no alternative or "moment for deliberation." See supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
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borders Yugoslavia is Hungary. 7 Hungary, like all bordering states, has been
warned by Yugoslavia not to participate in NATO objectives. As a NATO
member, Hungary has an indirect role in the activities of NATO, but the
Yugoslav warning seems too tenuous to justify bombing campaigns.8 Even
if NATO was acting pursuant to a customary law right of collective anticipa-
tory self defense, it is a stretch to claim that its action was in response to the
anticipated threat to Hungary, the only Member state bordering Yugoslavia.
This is especially true because Yugoslav warnings to Hungary not to
participate in the NATO actions came after the first NATO attacks. 9
The West has justified NATO's actions as humanitarian acts to prevent the
ethnic cleansing and genocide taking place in Yugoslavia.' Is this a legitimate
justification for the bombing? Even if it is morally justifiable, does it
overcome the existing illegality as it is in violation of the U.N. Charter and
possibly the European Convention? These considerations create a troubling
dilemma: Should nations capable of intervention refrain from military action
despite awareness of atrocities committed by Slobodan Milosevic, or get
involved despite its illegality? The fact that there has been neither a Security
Council Resolution authorizing the use of force nor an immediate threat to a
NATO Member sufficient to trigger an action of anticipatory collective self
defense does not justify inaction. The tension between these possibilities has
been considered by many:
This war has marked out with awkward clarity the irresistible
tension between two distinct forms of international law. The
first, and most familiar, of these is that of the United Nations
Charter designed to preserve the territorial integrity of
sovereign states. The second, born at Nuremberg and
developed subsequently in international conventions against
genocide and torture, holds that there are some crimes that
transcend the inviolability of nation states.9
Though not conclusive, an increasingly recognized right of humanitarian
intervention may help to resolve the dilemma between illegal intervention and
the need to stop acts that violate fundamental human rights.
s See Schwabach, supra note 30, at 410.
s See id.; see also The West Versus Serbia, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 1999, at 49.
'9 See i. at 410-11.
90 See Bilder, supra note 3, at 155.
9' Philip Stephens, Fighting a Just War, FIN. I MS, Apr. 16, 1999, at 12.
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IV. POSSIBILITY FOR A CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW RIGHT OF
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
A third possibility for defending the NATO bombing is by asserting a
customary international law right of humanitarian intervention, though this
may be naively hopeful. The idea is that humanitarian intervention, or the use
of force to prevent genocidal acts such as those in the former Yugoslavia, has
evolved into a legal right based on similar armed intervention in the past.
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"The allied intervention in northern Iraq in 1991 to save the Kurds, and the
imposition of a no-fly zone in southern Iraq to save the Shia Muslims there,
were undertaken without explicit authorization by a Security Council
resolution, but were also widely accepted as legitimate."93 One may also point
to India's invasion of Bangladesh in the 1970s or the intervention in 1990 of
West African countries to cease the killings in Liberia.94 While these actions
arguably fail to provide a sufficient historical precedent for armed humanitar-
ian intervention, the idea increasingly merits consideration.
Speaking strictly within the law, it is unlikely that NATO's bombing
campaign could be justified through customary international law. The U.N.
Charter's prohibition on the use of force without Security Council authoriza-
tion is an established tenet in international law, and it is unlikely that this can
be circumvented by putting forth a customary international law right that is
tenuous and does not have more historical precedent. Interestingly, the U.N.
Security Council, while never authorizing force, did recognize the need to
prevent the ethnic cleansing and has not at any point directly condemned the
NATO bombings.95 It should, however, be pointed out that three of the
Security Council members representing almost half of the world's population
did vote to condemn the NATO bombings. Efforts by China, India, and Russia
on March 26, 1999 were unsuccessful in this attempt.9' Unless the bombings
can be justified as fitting within a right of anticipatory collective self defense
or armed humanitarian intervention, they would likely be illegal.
Article 2 of the European Convention provides a final justification option.
This Article allows the use of force when it is no more than absolutely
necessary to defend any person from unlawful violence.97 The judges at the
European Court of Human Rights presumably could base their decision as to
92 See Law and Right: When TheyDon'tFit Together, THE EcoNoMIST, Apr. 3, 1999, at 19.
93 Id. at 20.
94 Id.
9' See S.C. Res. 1199, U.N.SCOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/Res/I 199 (1998).
" See Schwabach, supra note 30, at 417.
97 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 20, at art. 2.
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the necessity of the bombing on the defense of the innocent victims of
Milosevic's unlawful violence. The Court will likely be faced with the same
difficulty as anyone viewing the unfolding of events. One must weigh the
legitimacy of the bombing campaign waged to stop the genocide with the
civilian casualties that resulted from bombing targets that were arguably
nonmilitary in nature. In doing this, one must consider the bombing campaign
generally as well as the lethal attack at the station. For example, it is unclear
why NATO used "cluster bombs," many of which lie undetonated and
continue to harm and kill civilians.9" Also questionable is NATO pilots
dropping bombs from 15,000 feet, beyond Yugoslav anti-aircraft defenses."
While this practice helped to ensure that there was not a single Allied Force
casualty, bombing from such a high altitude may have sacrificed accuracy,
thereby resulting in more civilian deaths. If the bomb that destroyed the radio
television station was one of many targets that had to be hit in order to
adequately protect innocent lives, then the court should side with Great Britain
and other NATO members. However, if much of the criticism of the bombing
is well-founded, that this bombing was an abuse of discretion and power
resulting in many deaths, then it is only right that these families be compen-
sated.
V. FACTORS DETERMINING THE OUTCOME
Predicting the outcome of the suit against the British government is very
difficult given all of the variables. It is impossible not to take political
considerations into account, such as whether any of the British government
officials will be indicted for war crimes, though this appears very improbable.
Also, it seems that there is no consensus on the success or legality of the
NATO bombing campaign. It is hard to know how such variables may impact
any judgment by the Court of Human Rights.
If the panel at the Court of Human Rights is able to examine the bombing
of the radio television station unclouded by political considerations, even
taking into account the purported humanitarian justification for the bombing
campaign, it seems that the NATO members should be held liable. It simply
does not appear that there is enough of a connection between the need to
defend innocent lives and the destruction of a television station to that end.
The justification for the bombing was the desperate need to stop the propa-
"See Amnesty International, supra note 5, at 10.
" See id. at 9.
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ganda that was being broadcast from Belgrade.'0° Even if NATO was
successful in shutting down Milosevic's means for spreading his delusional
ideas, is there any assurance that it would have saved lives?'"' Given the fact
that the destruction of the target did not accomplish the goal of limiting
Milosevic's message, what good did it do?
While preventing the further spread of Milosevic's propaganda appears to
be a weak justification for the bombing, the power of the media under
Milosevic should not be underestimated. "Through a barrage of propaganda
via the state-owned media, Milosevic played on Serb fears and feelings of
victimization, going back to their defeat by the Ottomans at Kosovo in
1389...' 2, "The virus of television spread ethnic hatred like an epidemic."'0 3
Propaganda included such things as "a Nato symbol turning into a swastika
and a montage of Madeleine Albright growing Dracula teeth in front of a
burning building."'m4 The television programming never included any mention
of the ethnic cleansing of thousands of Albanian refugees, or the horrors
continuing in other areas of a disintegrating Yugoslavia. Rather, there were
films that glorified Yugoslav soldiers and played "soporific tapes of President
Slobodan Milosevic meeting patriarchs, Cossacks, Russian envoys and the
Kosovo Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova."' 5
Many are not convinced that propaganda was the true reason for the
bombing. Rather, they think there was simply a disagreement over the subject
matter of much of what was being broadcast. Weeks before the bombing,
NATO stated that the Radio Television Station should be carrying six hours
of Western television a day.'" When this requirement was not met, American
satellite workers in Belgrade were instructed to leave the radio television
station offices. 0 7 Shortly thereafter, the station was bombed, killing innocent
civilians working inside.'0
'® See Amnesty International, supra note 5, at 23.
0 The success of the bombing is highly questionable. Destruction of the station stopped
broadcasts for no more than six hours. Shortly thereafter, the broadcasts were running again
from portable satellites. See Robert Fisk, Stop Bombing Yugoslavia-Bombing Belgrade's TV
Centre, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 24, 1999, available at http://www.aidc.org.za/archives/
yugoslavia/yugo-independent.html.
'o See Scharf, supra note 7, at 25.
,o See id. (quoting Warren Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its
Destroyers-America's Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why (1996)).
'"0 Fisk, supra note 101.
1o5 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
1os Id.
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If the destruction of the radio television station was considered a necessary
objective in the bombing campaign, it is more difficult to determine whether
it might be considered successful in protecting innocent lives. Despite a
tendency to look at the. success of the NATO action collectively, it is
imperative that acts of war be viewed individually so that responsible parties
are held accountable for human rights violations.
Another question that arises when considering the outcome of a suit is how
to enforce ajudgment. For a system that sometimes lacks teeth when it comes
to enforcement, the European Court of Human Rights has been successful in
the realm of international law and ensuring that liable parties satisfy judg-
ments. For the most part, states have adhered to the Article 46 mandate that
all of the High Contracting Parties agree to abide by final judgments handed
down.' 09 It is in a state's best interest to pay judgments handed down against
it because failure to do so may result in the state losing its status as a member
of the Convention.
VI. ASSERTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
Finally, it is worth reviewing the process that one must endure in seeking
redress in the European Court of Human Rights from the perspective of one
of the families who lost their children in the attack. It is easy to forget how
horrific it must be to have been there or lost ldved ones in the attack on the
radio television station. An attorney in Belgrade summed it up well:
The worst consequences of this attack are, however, those
people who died or are wounded. Those were mostly young
technicians, who were simply working there, not the part of
any propaganda machinery, and not the people who are
creating news in RTS. The girl, 26 years old, who was doing
the make-up, the guy 30 years old, sound technician, those
guys who worked as security for the building... they died,
their families are destroyed. "o
In the aftermath of this bombing, when the families want to know who
should answer for what must appear as a senseless killing, what are they to do?
According to the "Notice to Applicants" on how to apply to the European
Court of Human Rights, anyone seeking redress from the court has to act
,o See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 20, at art. 46.
1o Fisk, supra note 101.
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quickly. They have six months to seek a remedy in British Courts or perhaps
to make a direct application to the Court."' This seems both unfair and
unrealistic. While it may have been accomplished in this case, it is unduly
burdensome to expect applicants who are living in a state of war to be able to
seek redress in a foreign nation or to act within such a stringent time limit.
Further, the instructions on how one is to seek redress is unclear. There must
be further explanation on which State and which courts must be tried before
applying to the European Court of Human Rights.
The discretion that the Court has exercised in granting or denying
applications is well placed, but it makes it very difficult to predict the success
of potential applicants. There should be an explicit set of rules to ensure a
potential applicant that he or she is doing all that is necessary to preserve the
possible future success of an application to the Court of Human Rights.
In this case, one may assume that the families would have to exhaust the
remedies available in the United Kingdom. Serbia is not a High Contracting
Member to the Convention, while the United Kingdom is. However, if it was
a French citizen suing the British government, the application does not clarify
whether one would have to exhaust remedies available in the British or French
courts.11
2
Moreover, one must question the prudence of requiring domestic remedies
to be exhausted in all situations. How is one to expect a surviving family
member in a warring Yugoglavia or Argentina to have the resources and
capabilities to bring suit in another country? In this case, a team of interna-
tional lawyers is representing the families for free, but surely this cannot be an
expectation. Once the case reaches the Court of Human Rights, one may be
eligible for free legal aid, but what should one do until then?"' There must be
more accessible, receptive means for registering a complaint with the court.
This, of course, would be made much easier if the court had the resources it
required, but it is a need that cannot be ignored.
'. It is unclear what is actually required. While the application seems to give little
alternative but to (1) Exhaust domestic remedies, and (2) Apply to the Court of Human Rights,
there are indications that this may not be necessary. Recall from the Belgrano news stories, the
time period in that case began from the sinking of the Belgrano, so there is at least a possibility
that the families could successfully apply by October 23, 1999, six months from the bombing.
"' Both France and Great Britain are members ofthe European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
113 Paragraph 22 in "Notice for the attention of persons wishing to apply to the European
Court of Human Rights" reads, "At a later stage in the proceedings, if you have insufficient
means to pay a lawyer's fees, you may be eligible for free legal aid. But legal aid cannot be
granted at the time when you lodge your application." See Notes for the guidance of persons
wishing to apply to the European Court of Human Rights, supra note 49, at para. 22.
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Perhaps some of the burden can be put on the countries that are accused of
the violation. If applicants were able to lodge complaints with the European
Court of Human Rights before exhausting domestic remedies, it may
encourage violating states to aid the petitioner in trying the case in their state
before having to take the time and expense of defending in Strasbourg. If this
alternative were available to the families in Belgrade, for example, the
European Court of Human Rights could hear the case if Great Britain was too
slow in trying the case or the judgment rendered in the United Kingdom was
unsatisfactory. Conversely, if the case resulted in a fair outcome in Great
Britain, it could conclude with approval by the court in Strasbourg. This
would have the further desired effect of bringing the legal systems in the States
of the High Contracting Members into line with the European Convention on
Human Rights.
It is important to note that while there are accessibility problems and
burdensome delays associated with applying to the European Court of Human
Rights, its importance and necessity in the prevention of Human Rights
violations is unquestionable. Since its creation, the number of cases filed has
steadily increased, and the ability of the Court to curb the sovereign power of
a State is crucial. In fact, the difficulties it is experiencing now with a
backbreaking case load and lack of funding, while difficult to handle, may be
signs that the court is effective. It is essential that the Belgrade families be
able to register a complaint against strong Western governments and perhaps
hold them accountable if they in fact violated the European Convention.
Finally, one should look to the future of international law and humanitarian
intervention. While it is arguably nonexistent now, there seems to be a sound
basis for supporting a customary international law right of humanitarian
intervention. In this case, had Great Britain and other NATO members
complied strictly with the law, there would have been no bombing campaign.
In the absence of a Security Council Resolution to intervene, people outside
the former Yugoslavia would presumably sit and watch the killings continue
without making any forceful attempt to stop the actions ofMilosevic. Western
leaders could doubtfully do that for long in the wake of the genocide from
World War II. It is often said that nations cannot sit by and let history repeat
itself, and the law says something very different. Under the law, it is okay to
watch."
4
At the same time, it is imprudent to encourage a legalized humanitarian
response that is free from restrictions or investigation after the fact. There
must be violations of human rights sufficient to justify an armed response. If
"" See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 92, at 20.
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such justification exists, the response must be proportional and intended to
stop the violations, rather than simply to spread Western ideals. "5 Christopher
Greenwood, a law professor at the London School of Economics, proposed the
legalizing of such action. In restricting the doctrine of armed humanitarian
intervention, Greenwood argues that "there would have to be impartial
determinations of three facts: that a catastrophe was occurring; that it was a
threat to international peace; and who was responsible."' 6 Greenwood further
proposes that because these factors were satisfied by Security Council
resolutions, the NATO bombing was legal, despite the absence of a resolution
on the use of force."'
There is substantial merit in a doctrine such as this. It is important to
respect the power and voice of the dissenting members of the Security Council
and the U.N. Charter's prohibition on the unauthorized use of force. However,
should political alliances and ideological differences prevent the use of force
to combat blatant human rights violations? Are the ideological differences so
stark that it is impossible for the permanent members of the Security Council
to agree that thousands of people are being wrongfully killed? A legally
acceptable method of armed humanitarian intervention is a necessary
alternative to ensure that abuses do not recur unchecked.
However, humanitarian intervention must be heavily scrutinized and
appropriately punished when used unnecessarily or disproportionately. Aright
under customary international law cannot be the means by which Western
nations spread their ideals or keep potential threats benign. Armed interven-
tion must be scrutinized at every step, and adequate enforcement measures are
needed.
It is perhaps unrealistic and nalve to suggest measures that combine the
best of both worlds. One simply cannot sit by and watch human rights
atrocities go unchecked in another country, yet there must be a system in place
to ensure that intervention conforms to rules designed to avoid violations that
one is trying to protect against. How history views the success of the NATO
bombings will likely have an effect on the development of a customary
international law norm allowing the use of force to prevent widespread human
rights violations. Regardless of the legality of intervention, efforts must
continue to ensure that victims of war such as those in Belgrade have sufficient
'" Here, one may think of NATO members trying to force six hours of CNN broadcasts a day
through the radio television station. While it may be important to secure an outsider's
perspective on the conflict, failure to comply with such demands should not warrant forceful
military action.
16 See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 92, at 20.
117 See id.
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means to have their complaints heard and hold violators accountable for their
actions.

